An axiomatic characterization of the n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is presented, based on a reduced game property.
Introduction
In recent years the concepts of reduced games and corresponding reduced game properties have proved to be fruitful tools in cooperative game theory. Many well-known solution concepts have been characterized with the aid of such concepts.
The general principle is as follows. Given a solution concept for a class of games, a game in that class, and a subset of the set of players involved in that game, one defines a new ('reduced') game for that subset of players, depending in some way or other on the outcome assigned to the original game-in particular, the payoffs for the players outside that subset may be specified; then the solution at hand satisfies the 'reduced game property ' (or: is 'consistent') if the players in the reduced game obtain the same payoffs as in the original game at the solution outcome.
In the area of transferable (and non-transferable) utility games, by now most accepted solution concepts [(pre)nucleolus, core, Shapley value] have been characterized by appropriate reduced game properties -see Driessen (1991) for a survey. Not all of these properties have an equally natural or intuitive economic interpretation, but they do conform to the general principle formulated above and characterize the solution concept under consideration. Thus, the issue has two sides: Given an appealing reduced game property, are there solutions satisfying it? But also: Given an accepted solution concept, can one find a reduced game property satisfied by it?
Also in the area of bargaining, reduced game properties have been studiedsee Thomson (1990) 
The reduced game property and characterization results
Let M, a finite subset of the natural numbers, denote a set of players. Let rW": denote the Cartesian product of ]M\ copies of Iw, indexed by the players in M. A bargaining game for M is a subset S of rWy satisfying the following requirements:
l S is non-empty and compact, and contains a strictly positive vector.
l S is comprehensive, i.e. y E S whenever y E rW": and y %x for some x E S.
The interpretation of such a bargaining game is that the players in M try to reach an agreement or ourcome x E S, giving utility xi to player i EM. If they fail, each player ends up with zero utility. The conditions imposed here on a bargaining game are standard in axiomatic bargaining theory. Note that there is no convexity requirement on a bargaining game S; all our results hold without this standard requirement, but remain valid if it is included. The disagreement outcome has been normalized to the origin (see also the remark below concerning the scale invariance axiom). BM denotes the set of all bargaining games for M. Let N be a given set (population) of potential players. N may be a finite but also an infinite subset of the natural numbers. Let
denote the collection of all bargaining games for finite subsets of N. A (bargaining) solution on B, is a function cp on B, with q(S) ES for all S E B,. Two-person bargaining games were introduced by Nash (1950), while the idea to consider a variable number of players, is, in this context, due to Thomson (1983) . The axiomatic approach to bargaining implies formulating 'reasonable' properties or axioms for bargaining solutions, and characterizing solutions by these axioms.
Here, we are interested in the K&i-Smorodinsky solution K defined as follows (cf. Raiffa, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) . For S E BM let the utopia point u(S) E lRy be defined by u,(S) : = yg xi for all i E M. Then K(S) is the maximal point of S on the line segment connecting u(S) and the origin. Let W(S) : = {x E S 1 there is no y E S with y > x} denote the weakly Pareto optimal subset of a bargaining game S. It is straightforward to verify that K satisfies the following three 'standard' axioms for a solution cp on B,:
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): cp(S) E W(S) for all S E B,.
Anonymity (AN): For every finite MC N, all i, j E M, and all S, T E BM such that T arises from S by interchanging the ith and jth coordinates of the points of S, we have: vi(S) = qj(T), cpj(S) = cp,(T), and (pk(S) = (pk(T) for all k f i, j.
Scale invariance (SI): For every finite subset M of N and every vector a E rWy, we have cp(aS) = up(S), where (ux)~ := uixi for all x E rW": and i EM, and aS := {ax\xES}.
As is well known and obvious, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution does not satisfy the stronger, version of WPO defined by requiring the solution outcome to be not even weakly dominated.
Anonymity requires that the names of the players do not matter. The usual formulation of Scale Invariance contains a 'translation invariance' part: here, this part is implicit by the normalization of the disagreement point to the origin.
For later reference we define the following weakening of SI.
Homogeneity (HOM): For every finite subset M of N and every vector a E rW": with ai = uj for all i, j EM, we have cp(uS) = Q(S).
In order to formulate the main axiom we first need to introduce the concept of a reduced game. Let L and M be non-empty finite subsets of N with L CM. Let SEB". This distinguishes RGP from the multilateral stability axiom of Lensberg (1988) , where the reduced game is constrained by the payoffs of the 'deleted' players. For a given game, recursive application of RGP in fact learns that for each smaller game arising if a subset of the players were absent, the payoffs of the remaining players are in the same fixed proportion. Proportional solutions (Kalai, 1977) , which include the egalitarian solution (see below), obviously satisfy RGP. We do not claim that this is a natural requirement in all situations; but then again, we do not claim that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or proportional solutions are appropriate in all situations. It is easy to verify that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution K satisfies RGP. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the utopia point of a game S, is the projection of the utopia point of S. See Proof. We have already remarked that K satisfies the four axioms. Let now cp be a solution satisfying the four axioms. We will first prove that if IMl = 2 and S E B", then q(S) = K(S). Let M = {i, j} and S E BM (cf. Fig. 2 ). By SI, we may assume q(S) = u,(S) = 1. Let kEN\M and T : = convex hull(S U {e"}) C lRy.'3k' where eo = e" = 0 and e: = 1. By WPO and AN we have 4~i(Tti,k)) = ~k('Z'ci,k)) = Vj(T,j,,,) = pk(T,,,,,) = + .
By RGP and SI it follows that cp,(T) = cpi(T), and applying RGP and SI again, we obtain q(s) = K(S).
If /M/=1 and SEB", then p(S) = K(s) by WPO of q. Let now /MI >2 and S E BM with (without loss of generality by SI) ui(S) = 1 for every i E M. Let i,j E M, then qi(i(sCi,,)) = q (S,i,j,) by the above and SI.
Hence by RGP: cp,(S) = q(S). Since this holds for all i, j E M, we conclude by WPO: $'(S)=K(S).

0
Theorem 1 does not hold if there are only two players in the player population N. In that case, any weakly Pareto optimal bargaining solution has the Reduced Game Property; for Pareto optima1 solutions (like the two-player KalaiSmorodinsky solution) this is true not only in the sense as defined in this paper, but also in the sense of Lensberg (1988) . Lensberg distinguishes between Bilateral and Multilateral Stability. Similarly, we introduce the following weakening of RGP.
Weak Reduced Game Property (WRGP): For all non-empty finite subsets L and M of N with L CM and IL] = 2 and all SE B": #T"') = BOB, By going over the proof of Theorem 1, the following result is immediate. It can be verified easily that for Scale Invariant solutions RGP implies MON. The converse, however, is not true. We construct an example as follows. Let M be a non-empty finite subset of N, and let n E N. Define a function f : [0, l] + [WM by f;(t):=tif iEM, i# IZ and f,(t) := t2, for all t E [0, 11. For S E BM with u,(S) = 1 for all i E M, let p(S) be the unique point of W(S) on the graph off; cp is then defined on all of BM be requiring it to be Scale Invariant. We leave it for the reader to verify that this solution satisfies MON but not RGP. Thus, under Scale Invariance, MON is weaker than RGP. This is also suggested by the fact that in his characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution Thomson (1983) essentially needs an infinite population of agents.
We conclude this section with an extension of Theorem 3. For an infinite population N we will describe all solutions on B, satisfying SIR, HOM, and RGP. To this end, let i, denote the minimum of N, and let PN denote the set of all vectors p E iwy+ with pi, = 1 (this is just a suitable normalization). Let r : PN-+ PN be a map associating with every p E PN a vector T(P) E PN such that, for all p, p E PN and all finite subsets M of N, if pM is a positive multiple of FM, then QT(P)~ is a positive multiple of am.
By n,,, we denote the collection of all such maps 7r. With r E 17, we associate a bargaining solution (or on B,, as follows. Let SE B", where M is a finite subset of N, then q"(S) is the unique point of W(S) of the form w(p),,,
where pw is a multiple of the utopia point of S. We call such a solution cpr a generalized proportional solution. For n being identity, cp" is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. If 7r is the constant map assigning the vector with all ones to every p, then cp n is the egalitarian solution.
It is easy to verify that for every rr E fl,, the solution (pm satisfies SIR and HOM. RGP follows by the special condition imposed on the map rr. Conversely, if cp is a solution satisfying SIR, HOM, and RGP, then by Lemma 1 it is Weakly Pareto Optimal. Then, the proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to show that cp is of the form cp=. Summarizing, we have: Similarly, in an earlier version of this paper' a non-cooperative game is described of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is given by applying the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The subgames of that non-cooperative game correspond to the reduced games defined in the previous section. An earlier non-cooperative implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is provided by Moulin (1984) .
